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. As a whole, this literature casts doubt on the widespread belief that there is a positive, robust, significant relationship from advertising to CSR. Having read each study in detail, I can attest that the collective difficulty of establishing the relationship from advertising to CSR has not been appreciated by the individual scholars in Table 1 .1. Future researchers will need to do more to theorize why this relationship is absent or to discover the boundary, mediating, and moderating conditions that govern the relationship. The sections that follow will assist in this effort by clarifying the prevailing logics that justify an expected relationship from advertising to CSR and by providing yet more evidence that the relationship from advertising to CSR is not very robust.
THEORY AND SCHEMA

Strategic Logics
Several logics reinforce the expectation that advertising generates CSR. Figure 1 .1 separates these logics into two groups: those related to strategy and those related to politics. There are three logics in the strategic category. Each logic has a critical background condition -strong support for CSR in the general public or among targeted consumers. This background condition is well documented: consistent evidence of positive public via free access sentiment toward CSR-practicing companies is found in surveys of not only consumers (Nielsen, 2013) , but also investors (World Economic Forum and International Business Leaders Forum, 2003) , employees (Turban and Greening, 1997) , supply-chain partners (Strangberg Consulting, 2013) , and business leaders themselves (Bolívar, Garde Sánchez, and López Hernández, 2014) . It is this robust support for CSR across stakeholders that allows CSR, much like advertising, to be used as a form of company differentiation and, some have argued, to be used in a manner that is nearly equivalent to advertising, such that CSR and advertising are substitutable. The first strategic logic is that high competition generates CSR because CSR enables firms to differentiate themselves from their competitors. 'It might happen,' in other words, 'that firms subject to more competitive environments increase their expenditure in R&D or advertisement in addition to undertaking CSR initiatives' (Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo, 2010, p. 463) . This is because CSR, much like R&D, can be the basis of a differentiation campaign, as CSR is presumably costly (and thus not easily imitable) and as it allows firms to align themselves and their products with emerging consumer CSR preferences (He and Li, 2011; Melo and Garrido-Morgado, 2012) .
CSR can provide brand differentiation in numerous ways. It can improve consumer attitudes toward companies (Menon and Kahn, 2003; Wang, 2009) . It may mitigate consumer mistrust of companies in the wake of a scandal (Mattila, Hanks, and Kim, 2010) . It may raise consumer purchase intent or willingness to pay (Archer, Kozak, and Balsillie, 2005; Hiscox and Smyth, 2006) . Overall, studies finding positive economic effects of CSR are diverse, spanning theoretical postulation (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) , survey data (Madden, Roth, and Dillon, 2012) , content analysis (Cox, 2008) , practitioner interviews (Nicholson, 2007) , field experiments (Hiscox and Smyth, 2006) , and laboratory experiments (Menon and Kahn, 2003) . These studies are diverse also in industrial setting, including the food (Jones, Comfort, and Hillier, 2007) , retail (Hiscox and Smyth, 2006) , cosmetic (Zhao, 2012) , and banking industries (Mattila et al., 2010) .
Large advertisers are probably well positioned to gain these differentiation effects from CSR. These companies will be the best able to generate consumer awareness of their CSR deeds, a necessary condition to profit from CSR activity. Indeed, several large-scale regression analyses of American companies have found that CSR communication intermediates between CSR and financial returns (Servaes and Tomayo, 2012; Wagner, 2010) . This has led many academics to argue that companies are falling short of their potential by not advertising CSR activities more comprehensively (Birth et al., 2008; Carrigan, 1997) .
The second logic construes both advertising and CSR as a proxy for the closeness of companies to consumers. This logic has been stated explicitly in regard to philanthropy, a classic CSR domain. 'Sensitivity to consumer interests,' that is, 'will help to explain a significant, positive relationship between philanthropy and advertising expenditures' (Lerner and Fryxell, 1988, p. 952) . Reflecting this logic, there have been numerous quantitative studies attempting to predict CSR from the closeness of the companies to their consumers, as measured sometimes by advertising expenditures but also by whether a company is in a consumer-facing industry, such as retail or household items (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Giovannucci, Von Hagen, and Wozniak, 2014) .
Extending the first two logics, the third logic draws an equivalence between CSR and advertising. CSR and advertising, here, are each promotional activities intended to enhance corporate reputations. 'Since CSR promotes the reputation of the firm,' in other words, 'it may substitute for advertising' and 'social spending is akin to advertising' (Jiraporn et al., 2014, pp. 513 and 505) . This logic has also been apparent in scholarship on corporate philanthropy. That is, both philanthropy and advertising may build consumer loyalty: 'As in most cases both corporate philanthropy and advertising serve the common purpose of building customer loyalty, we predict that firms with large advertising expenses will tend to have higher likelihood of giving and to donate larger amounts' (Zhang et al., 2009, p. 40) . Indeed, Brammer and Millington (2005, p. 519) suggest that a low marginal cost of philanthropy, compared to the gains in consumer exposure from philanthropy, will generate a shift in resources from advertising to philanthropy. If CSR and advertising are thus equivalent, high advertisers might reasonably be the most likely companies to engage in CSR, either directly or to substitute advertising for CSR.
The hypothesis below, drawing from the three logics above, features the concept of advertising intensity. Advertising intensity is most commonly indicated in empirical research by total advertising expenditures divided by sales, although sometimes assets are the denominator (see Table 1 .1). The use of advertising intensity as the key independent variable in empirical research has become conventional, owing in part to its use in one of the earliest studies in this domain (Fry et al., 1982) and to its suggested use by a highly cited agenda-setting piece for CSR research (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001, p. 120) . Even so, the quantitative analyses of this chapter, as a check on robustness, test other indicators of advertising, such as total advertising expenditures, both logged and unlogged, and advertising expenditures in which missing values are replaced with a zero.
Our first hypothesis is thus as follows:
H1a: There is a positive relationship from advertising intensity to corporate social responsibility
While the foregoing suggests that general advertising increases CSR, a slightly different conceptualization may provide a tighter test of the logic of the strategic hypotheses. This conceptualization replaces CSR (in general) with CSR reporting. If CSR is nearly equivalent to advertising, according to the third logic above, then CSR reporting is an even closer equivalent. CSR reporting, as a crude definition, is the standardized dissemination of CSR information to stakeholders often through third-party reporting platforms such as the Carbon Disclosure Project or Global Reporting Initiative (Meyer, Pope, and Isaacson, 2015; Pope and Meyer, 2015; Pope and Lim, 2017) . CSR reporting is similar to advertising in that both provide positive informational and persuasive messages about companies to the general public. To justify further an expected relationship between advertising and CSR reporting, since large advertisers have well-practiced corporate identities and longstanding relationships with marketers, they may face lower adoption costs of CSR reporting. At the very least, observers have drawn parallels between CSR reporting and advertising. For example, the CSR reports of global frameworks, for example, the Global Compact and Global Reporting Initiative, are sometimes called 'forms of green marketing in themselves' (Alves, 2009, p. 8) and 'public relations operations' (Capdevila, 2007, p. 1) , which allow firms to obtain an undeserved 'branding makeover' (Hildebrandt, 2003, p. 103) , 'project a good image' (Utting, 2000, p. 8) , and receive a 'free public relations ride' (Thérien and Pouliot, 2006, p. 68) . Due to the similarities between advertising and CSR reporting, it is reasonable to expect the following:
H1b: There is a positive relationship from advertising intensity to CSR reporting
Political Logics
There is one major political logic. It renders advertising as a proxy for visibility and suggests, further, that visibility leads to CSR through the mechanism of public scrutiny. 'Advertising. . .can also play a role in increasing the visibility of the firm. . . The bigger or more visible, the more susceptible corporations will be to public scrutiny and the more encouraged. . .to engage in strategic CSR' (Melo and Garrido-Morgado, 2012, p. 20) . In this logic, visibility, indicated by advertising, prompts CSR in response to present or anticipated pressure from activists.
The power of visibility to promote CSR does not necessarily hinge on advertising as a proxy. Visibility can be operationalized also as company size. Udayasankar (2008) , for example, argues that: 'smaller firms may face fewer pressures, or gain little recognition from CSR, given their comparatively lower visibility.' Visibility can also be operationalized as public ownership. Blombäck and Wigren (2009, p. 259) , for example, argue that private firms are less visible and thus less likely to undertake CSR. When operationalized as size or public ownership, visibility has been found to have a very consistent relationship with CSR, as evidenced by numerous surveys on ownership structure and CSR (KPMG, 2011, p. 6; Lee, 2009; Li and Zhang, 2010 ) and by several meta-studies on company size and CSR (Blombäck and Wigren, 2009; Lepoutre and Aimé, 2006; Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998) .
The background condition for the political logic, of course, is the presence of social movements that, first, promulgate and enforce CSR norms and, second, do so strategically by targeting highly visible firms. In the first regard, those who take a conflict-theory view of CSR have chronicled many new tactics and platforms by which social movements have compelled companies to improve their CSR performance. For instance, activists have used negative messaging campaigns on Twitter to 'Tweetjack' companies into discontinuing irresponsible practices (Lyon and Montgomery, 2013) . They have used similar tactics in the comments sections of news stories and on Facebook pages (Cho and Hong, 2009) . They have appropriated and satirized company logos to associate the company with its perceived injustices (Klein, 1999) . Their more organized efforts have resulted in the creation of organizational rankings that monitor and ultimately discipline companies according to such metrics as the percentage of women on executive boards and the pounds of carbon emissions (Gjølberg, 2009; Parguel et al., 2011) .
In the second regard, quantitative researchers have indeed documented that highly visible firms are targeted more often for social movement activism, even controlling for CSR performance. Bartley (2007b) , for example, found that firms with larger assets and higher reputations were targeted with greater intensity by the anti-sweatshop movements of the late 1990s. King (2008) has provided a mechanism to explain this behavior. He has argued and documented that the 'amount of media coverage to any particular boycott is partly a function of the overall salience and visibility of the firm' (p. 405). It is reasonable to expect that social movements, which like other organizations are resource-constrained, may selectively target highly visible firms on the basis that the boycott's power will be magnified by the greater media coverage of highly visible firms. Thus, if there is considerable social movement activism in favor of CSR, if advertising increases a firm's visibility, 
METHODS
Sample
The sample of the chapter is the 2010 Fortune Global 500, compiled by Fortune magazine, an American bi-weekly for popular and business audiences with a circulation of about 800 000. Global 500 companies are the largest in the world by annual revenues. A common academic sample (e.g., Carroll and Sapinski, 2010) , the Global 500 includes public, private, and state-owned companies (about 75 percent are public), with representation from all ten sectors of the Global Industrial Classification Scheme (GICS) and from 35 countries. Global 500 companies, it should be noted, are not necessarily international. 
Dependent Variables
For H1a and H2, CSR is indicated by the CSR ratings of the Thomson-Reuters ASSET4 database. This database, retrieved through Datastream and active since 2002, assigns 4300 of the largest global companies (members of leading stock indices around the world such as the S&P 500 and the MSCI Emerging Markets) a score on their environmental, social, and governance performance (the score ranges from 0 to 100 to reflect the percentile rank of companies), based on a complex proprietary methodology that includes 18 data categories, which are based on 250 key performance indicators, which are themselves based on 750 data points. Since corporate governance is not commonly perceived to be a core dimension of CSR, it is excluded from the present analyses. For H1b, CSR reporting is indicated by three binary variables for yearly participation in three leading global CSR reporting initiatives. These are the Global Compact (GC), Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). Figure 1 .2 reports summary statistics and key details about each initiative. The initiatives were selected from globally oriented CSR guidebooks and compendiums (e.g., Visser et al., 2010) as those satisfying these requirements: longstanding (greater than ten-year history), independent (not administered by firms themselves), global (participation in scores of nations), pan-industry, and mostly firm-level membership (not factories, subsidiaries, or Note: Carbon Disclosure Project members include only those companies that returned the questionnaire and exclude those companies that were sent the questionnaire but did not return it. Countries represented and average participants' size are for the year 2013.
Sources:
Websites unglobalcompact.org; globalreportinginitiative.org; and special data request to the CDP office.
Figure 1.2 Comparison of three leading global CSR reporting initiatives
Shawn Pope -9781786432636 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 02/11/2019 08:57:58PM via free access nation-states). Each initiative requires the production of a voluntary annual report with standardized CSR disclosures at the corporate level. Each initiative has dramatically increased its membership roster since the turn of the millennium, with the GC now having more than 8000 members, the GRI 4000, and the CDP 2000. Figure 1 .2 shows that the substance of the reports that are required for membership in each initiative is wide ranging, with coverage that spans the topics of human rights, supply chain management, and biodiversity. GC is coded as 1 for members in good standing. GRI is 1 in the years a firm submits a GRI report to the GRI offices. CDP is 1 in the years a company responds to the main CDP survey (companies not sent the survey are dropped from analysis).
Independent Variables
The first and most standard indicator of advertising (see the previous studies in Table 1 .1) is annual advertising expenditures divided by annual sales, an indicator known as advertising intensity. Because sales, but not advertising, can be negative, negative sales and thus negative advertising intensities are dropped from the analysis. A few cases are also dropped where revenues are less than advertising, constraining advertising intensity to a fraction between 0 and 1. Given that advertising intensity, according to previous research, does not have a track record of a positive, significant relationship with CSR, I have also included other codings of advertising. More specifically, I include in the models total advertising expenditures (logged and unlogged) and an indicator of advertising intensity in which missing values are replaced with zeros (following Servaes and Tamayo, 2012) . I note that replacing missing advertising expenditures with zeros, in my opinion, may introduce a lot of empirical slippage, given that there are notable companies that are reported to have missing advertising expenditures but that clearly have them in all years (e.g., Walt Disney). Excessive missing data is common for advertising expenditures that are retrieved from major financial databases. American-listed firms, for example, are not required to report expenditures to the Securities and Exchange Commission -and most do not. Compustat lacks advertising for as much as 74 percent of company-years in recent studies (Baron, Harjoto, and Jo, 2009, p. 22) . Excessive missing data has prompted coping mechanisms. Researchers have dropped the variable (Tashman and Rivera, 2010) ; assigned nonreporters a value of zero (Servaes and Tamayo, 2012) ; assigned industry averages (Hull and Rothenberg, 2008) ; and created dummies for whether advertising is reported (Baron et al., 2009) 
Control Variables
Potential confounds include dummies for year, headquarters region (Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Africa and the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Canada and the United States) and the ten sectors of the GICS. These controls are broad (regions versus countries, sectors versus industries) to avoid overspecification and, relatedly, to reduce Type II errors (given the prominence of the view that advertising increases CSR, a false positive that supports this hypothesis seems preferable to a false negative that contradicts it). Size is another control -annual, USD, total assets rather than revenues, which are present already in the denominator of advertising intensity. Assets are logged due to a right skew that causes a rejection of the null hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis approximate a Gaussian distribution (p < 0.01; sktest in Stata).
Models
For H1a and H2, to predict ASSET4 scores, which are positive and nearly continuous variables, OLS panel regressions are specified in Stata 11. Residuals are company clustered and Huber-White robust standard errors are used as a basic guard against inconsistent heteroscedasticity. For H1b, the models predicting membership in the leading CSR reporting platforms are logistic regressions, since this membership is best coded as a binary variable.
RESULTS
Univariate statistics appear in Table 1 .2. The measures of advertising are moderately (0.02 to 0.28) and generally significantly (p < 0.05) associated with the measures of CSR. In terms of the hypotheses, the strongest correlations are between logged total advertising expenditures and all measures of CSR. Table 1 .3, which tests H1a and H2 (that advertising increases CSR) does not yield very robust evidence in favor of the hypotheses. As with previous literature in this research area, the relationship between the two constructs is generally positive and generally insignificant. As with the univariate statistics, however, the relationship appears to be stronger when logged total advertising expenditures are used as the advertising indicator, resulting in coefficients that are significant and positive for both the social and environmental scores of ASSET4. Even so, these findings as a whole do not robustly support a relationship from advertising to CSR.
H1b predicts that advertising increases CSR reporting. As additional descriptive evidence, Figure 1 .3 is a bar chart showing the number of companies in the global CSR reporting initiatives by industry (using the industry coding format as reported in each database). At a glance, the bar charts give little indication that the industries that are consumer facing, or that are otherwise heavy advertisers, have outsized initiative participation. For the Global Compact, the most represented industry by far, having a margin of over 2000 companies over the next most represented industry, is 'Industrial Goods and Services.' Companies in this industry tend to be intermediate manufacturers that are not oriented toward consumers, but to other companies. Moreover, when Note: CDP data are for the year 2011; industry codes were not provided for later years. As additional descriptive evidence, Figure 1 .4 presents another way to visualize the relationship between industry-level advertising intensity and industry-level participation in the global CSR initiatives. Each bubble in Figure 1 .4 represents a two-digit industry of the Standard Industrial Classification scheme that is represented in the current sample. The bubbles are plotted along two axes. The x-axis represents the average number of years that companies in each industry are members of the respective CSR initiatives. The y-axis represents the average advertising intensity by industry of companies in the current sample. The dotted line is a trend line fitted by the method of ordinary least squares. For each initiative, the industry-level relationship between advertising intensity and initiative participation is negative. That is, industries with higher advertising intensity tend to have lower rates of initiative participation. This relationship contradicts the assumption that there is a strong positive relationship between advertising intensity and initiative participation.
The regressions in Table 1 .4 are also not very supportive of the hypothesis that advertising increases CSR reporting. Here, as with the above, the coefficients of advertising are generally positive and generally insignificant. The sole exception is when advertising is treated as logged total advertising, generating a coefficient that is significant and positive for GRI membership. It must be noted, however, that this same variable is negative and marginally significant (p < 0.10) when predicting GC membership, and thus that the relationship is not robust across initiatives.
DISCUSSION
Scholarly investigations into whether advertising generates CSR are well underway, but the results of these inquiries have not been very supportive. On average, only about a third of studies have been able to document a positive relationship from advertising to CSR. The present study, likewise, has not improved the evidence in favor of the expected relationship. The present findings have been weak and mixed, despite models that were specified parsimoniously and despite extensive efforts to increase statistical power by chasing down missing values for advertising expenditures from multiple databases.
It should be mentioned that the present findings, which failed to observe a relationship from advertising to CSR, may appear more credible alongside a growing body of research that has failed to document the other direction of causality. This body of research shows that CSR, in general, fails to result in increased advertising to promote awareness of the good deeds. It is true that this body of research has been limited by the inability to gather expenditures on CSR advertising specifically, in contrast with total advertising generally, precluding researchers from conducting long-T, large-N quantitative studies. However, the literature has included many cross-sectional and qualitative studies, such as surveys, interviews, and case studies (e.g., Nicholson, 2007; Pomering and Dolnicar, 2009; Russo and Tencati, 2008; Tixier, 2003) . The results of these studies have been remarkably consistent: many, perhaps most CSR-practicing companies, do not advertise their good deeds. Moreover, the ones that do advertise their good deeds tend to engage only in local, limited, internal, or ad hoc advertising. This finding of an absent relationship from CSR to advertising is particularly puzzling given the obvious growth in CSR advertising in recent decades. This growth has been documented quantitatively by longitudinal content analyses (Ahern, Bortree, and Smith, 2013; Leonidou et al., 2011; Lill, Gross, and Peterson, 1986; Mögele and Tropp, 2010) . Reflecting this growth, advertisements with a CSR theme are now common on television and in print (Mögele and Tropp, 2010) . New CSR advertising techniques have been deployed, such as corporate-non-profit alliances and cause-related marketing (Varadarajan and Menon, 1988) . Company websites feature the advertisements, often as links to glossy electronic CSR reports or to mission statements that feature CSR language (Hooghiemstra, 2000) . Product labels are another medium, and packaging is now common that advertises 'fair trade' and 'sustainability,' for example, in the coffee (Basu and Hicks, 2008) , apparel (Hustvedt and Bernard, 2008) , timber (Archer et al., 2005) , seafood (Gudmundsson and Wessells, 2000) , orange juice (Grankvist and Lekedal, 2007) , and meat industries (Binnekamp and Ingenbleek, 2008) .
Notwithstanding this apparent growth in CSR advertising, it is becoming clearer with each new quantitative study that there is not a very strong link between advertising and CSR or between CSR and advertising, despite the prominence of several lines of strategic CSR theory that would expect such an outcome. Future researchers will need to do much more to determine why a presumed relationship between advertising and CSR is absent. My own suspicion is that researchers will succeed if they devote more consideration to the alternative explanation that CSR tends to be adopted for reasons that are not narrowly strategic.
Along these lines, in my own meta-study of 200 surveys conducted since the late 1990s that ask managers why they engage in CSR (Pope, 2016) , the most common explanation in all world regions and across all years is that CSR is adopted for ethical, moral, and normative reasons, rather than for strategic or political reasons (the very reasons that suggest a relationship from advertising to CSR). Clearly CSR that is adopted, for example, due to ethical motivations, does not necessitate high advertising expenditures before or after adoption. The adoption itself satisfies the initial motivation. However, this conception of CSR adoption very much runs against the strategic and political accounts that dominate the CSR literature. While some companies may engage in political and strategic CSR, most companies probably adopt CSR for normative reasons, especially as CSR has become a popular, international, and perhaps taken-for-granted movement in recent decades. NOTE 1. Advertising Age is a trade journal with 40 000 subscribers and perhaps the 'industry leading source for marketing and media news ' (MeritDirect, 2013) . Lists are available by subscription ($80/year) to the 'AdAge Datacenter' and compiled from surveys of advertising agencies and media monitoring firms in more than 95 countries. 2014 lists included mostly public companies (~80 percent), spanned eight of ten Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors, skewed toward Consumer Staples (32 percent) and Consumer Discretionary (31 percent), and contained 14 headquarter nations, with the USA as the mode (48 percent). Utilizing these lists ensures that the dataset has complete expenditures for the largest advertisers.
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